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Abstract
The claims for the restitution of legal estate by the First Nations in Canada are often without the
benefit of a written agreement, and they have to prove a spatial and temporal connection with
ancestral lands in their narratives. The witness is a storyteller who, in the absence of
documentary evidence, has to convince the court of the probative value of his evidence before
the oral testimony is admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay. This paper argues
that there is a need for a framework that contextualises the terminologies of Native witnesses and
submissions by understanding the epistemology of storytelling that is inherent in Indigenous
cultures and the authenticity of expression where there is no written evidence to substantiate a
claim.
I. INTRODUCTION
The appropriation of land from Indigenous peoples in the “discovered” world was launched
by the European nations based on the fiction that the land was terra nullius. This was a concept
that regarded the real estate of the native inhabitants as “vacant,” leaving Natives with no rights
in the land since time immemorial.2 In the North American continent, the land was deemed for
settlement as a colonial domain upon the Royal Proclamation,3 which resulted in the forfeiture of
the indigenous lands by treaty.4 Their claim to its restoration has to overcome the lack of
documentary title. The oral testimony of tribes is often the only evidence available, but is based
on hearsay evidence. Canadian courts have adopted different approaches to this conundrum, and
the success of litigation can be measured against the principles that the courts have developed..:
The probative value of oral narratives based on epistemology of indigenous culture and the
analogy with landscape gardening can override the presumption that stories are hearsay.
The indigenous peoples who were conquered in the period of “discovery” were not
literate in discourse, and as such did not enter documentary transaction when negotiating the
2

The concept that land had no title when colonised was based on the Papal Bulls of the 15th Century. The Romanus
Pontifex, 1452 proclaimed by Pope Alexander gave permission to King Alfonso of Portugal “to capture, vanquish
and subdue all Saracens, Pagans, and other enemies of Christ, to take all their possessions and property, and to put
them into perpetual slavery”. Gardiner, Frances, 19l7, European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States
and its Dependencies to 1648, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington. at 20-2.
3
The Royal Proclamation 1763 established the basis for treaties between the British Crown and later Canada and the
indigenous peoples. It states "We do hereby strictly forbid, on Pain of Our Displeasure, all Our loving Subjects from
making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of any of the Lands above reserved, without
Our especial Leave and Licence for that Purpose first obtained." Royal Proclamation of 1763: Rights,
Responsibilities and Treaties, indigenous and Northern Affairs, Canada, www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1379594359150/1379594420080.
4
For its continuing impact upon the indigenous peoples, see JOHN STECKLEY & BRYAN D. CUMMINS, FULL CIRCLE,
CANADA’S FIRST NATIONS 122 (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008). See also, JOHN BORROWS, WAMPUM AT NIAGARA:
THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION, CANADIAN LEGAL HISTORY, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 155-172 (Univ. of British
Columbia Press, 1997).

143

conveyance of their estates. Their lack of understanding of unfamiliar legal terms and conditions
of sale with the European Sovereign was the principal reason for the transfer without retaining
deeds of title as proof of previous ownership.5
The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas provides an explanation of
how the concept of literal communication was alien to indigenous tribes:
The greatest problem confronting scholars in researching the history of Native Americans
is that the written sources for that history derive largely from the non-Native side and are
subject to the distortions, misconceptions, biases, and ignorance that are generally
associated with history seen from an external cultural perspective. Moreover, the nature of
those biases and distortions has varied over the centuries, so that the data from which the
historian must draw need to be interpreted with an understanding of those changes 6
The anthropology of the period must consider the indigenous concept of communal
ownership rather than as a commodity where there is a vendor and a purchaser. The tribal
context of right to and enjoyment of land depends on oral narratives, and the indigenous litigants
can only produce oral testimony whose content is based on stories conveyed inter-generationally
that establish the spatial and time connection to land. This form of evidence asserts the truth of
the facts stated by a non-witness which is precluded in the common law courts by the rule
against hearsay.7
The form of property law practised in Canada is inherited under common law where the
title is recognised in fee simple, meaning that it was conveyed to the Crown in absolute
ownership. The indigenous peoples held only a possessory title to land, and this was a qualified
right recognised by the courts.8 The colonial authorities and then their successors denied the
right of alienation except to the Crown or the federal government and its true market value could
5

The Oxford Handbook of the History of International law states "the Aboriginal leadership had limited knowledge
of the national system that lay behind the colonial apparatus. What they did know was that their allies needed their
support and relied heavily upon their contributions." (Bardo Fasbender and Anne Peters, eds., 2013).
6

Bruce G. Trigger & Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, NORTH
AMERICA VOLUME 1 PART 1, NATIVE PEOPLE IN EURO- AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 7 (1996).
7
A witness can only give evidence of a fact of which the witness has personal knowledge because "any other source
of knowledge, whether it be what someone else has told the witness or something the witness has read, is hearsay
and is generally inadmissible”. RODERICK MUNDAY, CROSS AND TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 54 (10th ed. 2010).
8
In Tee Hit Ton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that it was “well settled” that Native Americans held claim
to lands in North America “under what is sometimes termed Indian title or permission" and that this description
means “mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.” 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). This was
affirmed in City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation, where Justice Ginsberg wrote for the majority: “[u]nder the
doctrine of discovery, fee title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the
sovereign, first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the United States.” 544 U.S. 197
(2005).
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not be obtained.9 However, the assertion of claims in court have to satisfy the scientific
framework that derives from the archaeological and geological findings and can be quantified
into an epistemology by the court.
This article examines the courts’ acceptance of oral histories that support the claims of the
indigenous peoples in Canada as an exception to hearsay evidence to proving the historical title
to land. Claimants may thereby establish their claims with the circumstantial evidence that their
land was appropriated by force or treaty negotiated under duress. The courts’ development of
principles in adjudging the admissibility of storytelling has to be viewed within the legal
framework that exists in Canada under the Constitution Act 1982, sections 25 and 35, which has
been termed the Indian Magna Carta. This paper asserts that the courts should adopt a receptive
theory of evidence based on the epistemology of tribal culture and draw an analogy with
landscape gardening based on accuracy of visual details retained in the narration of oral
storytellers.
A parallel can be drawn to the and the admissibility of Native storytelling as an exception to
the rule against hearsay in United States courts. The preeminent argument is as follows: the
courts must adopt a receptive theory of oral evidence because doing so will facilitate the pre-trial
hearings, directional stage, and the disclosures with more informed knowledge of the evidential
value of oral stories. The current narrow conception of the Anglo-American courts should be
rejected; instead, the concept of epistome should be applied in order to more closely define the
admissibility of hearsay oral evidence and to corroborate our conception of hearsay with
anthropological evidence.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND SUI GENERIS RIGHTS

The Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 10has been defined as a Charter of Fundamental
Rights for the First Nations of Canada. Its two most important provisions for affirmation of
indigenous rights are section 25 and section 35.11 The international recognition of the validity of

9

The US the Indian Non Intercourse Act of 1791 forbade sale or purchase from a non-government source; the Royal
Proclamation Act of 1763 had the same effect in Canada.
10
An Act to give effect to a request by the Senate and House of Commons of Canada. UK Public General Acts.
1982 c. 11, SCHEDULE B
11
Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, Sec. 25, 35. (“The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall
not be construed as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the
aboriginal peoples of Canada including (a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and (b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or
may be so acquired.”); Section 35(1) ("The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and affirmed. (2) In this Act, ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and
Métis peoples of Canada. (3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) ‘treaty rights’ includes rights that now exist by
way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired”).
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oral testimony by indigenous peoples is generally acknowledged in Canada.12 It is necessary to
assess to what extent these rights have been accepted in Canadian jurisprudence, where the rules
of evidence are framed on common law basis which abides by the reliability and the best
evidence rule. The application of this rule with regard to the admissibility to storytelling as an
exception to the hearsay rule needs to be examined to determine the jurisdictional approaches
and the possible basis for reform in the legal system.
The Canadian courts have two main avenues to admit oral history as evidence. First is a
judicially created “principled approach” to the hearsay rule, which reflects the constitutional
devise that indigenous rights and interests be recognised and affirmed.13 The admissibility of
evidence under the hearsay rule must be “necessary and reliable.” The trial judge determines
issue of reliability, and the determination is premised upon the basis that the events must have
occurred before living memory.14 The requirement of necessity may be met if the originator of
the story or the witness to its rendition are deceased and cannot be produced before the court.15
In R v Van der Peet,16 a member of the Stó:lō Nation, was charged for selling fish which
under their tribal food fishing license they were forbidden from selling as catch. The trial judge
held that the right to fish for food did not extend to the right to sell fish commercially. The
conviction was restored at the Court of Appeal, and the issue when the matter reached the
Supreme Court was the test for determining an “aboriginal right” under section 35 of the 1982
Act.17
Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, stated that:
[T]he basis for the aboriginal rights doctrine exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s
35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal
Canadian Community Economic Development Network (CED) 4th (online), Aboriginal Law, “The Canadian
Legal Framework: Constitutional Protection for Aboriginal Peoples: Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982:
Aboriginal Rights: Proof of Aboriginal Rights: Evidentiary Issues” (II.5.(a).(ii).B.4) at § 317.
13
BRUCE GLANVILLE MILLER, ORAL HISTORY ON TRIAL: RECOGNISING ABORIGINAL NARRATIVES IN THE COURTS,
8-9, 157 (UBC Press, 2012) (“In the Canadian context these questions take on significance because the Crown has
argued that oral materials are transformed into documents and hence are amenable to standard historiographic
methods”).
14
Val Napoleon, Delgamuukw: A Legal Straight-Jacket for Oral Histories?, 20 CANADIAN J. OF L. AND SOC’Y 131
(2005).
15
Lori Ann Roness & Kent McNeil, Legalising Oral History, Proving Aboriginal Claims in Canadian Courts 39 J.
OF THE WEST 66, 68 (2000).
16
R v. Van der Peet, 2 S.C.R. 507 (1996).
17
Id. See also, The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation
of Aboriginal Self Government, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1539869205136 (last visited May 16, 2022) (“The provision does not define the
term ‘aboriginal rights’ or provide a closed list of rights but has recognised the inherent right of self-government
under Section 35"). See also The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and
the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self Government (with the information you have in the footnote in a parenthetical with
the appropriate citation). ,
12
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peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in
distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries.18
His Honor wrote that in “determining whether an aboriginal claimant has produced
evidence sufficient to demonstrate” that “a practice, custom or tradition integral to a distinctive
aboriginal culture” the court must:
[A]pproach rules of evidence, and interpretation of the evidence that exists, with a
consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims, and of the evidentiary
difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there were no written
records of the practices, customs and traditions. The courts must not undervalue the
evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in common law
courts. The claims to aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific rather than
general basis.19
The principles established in this case came up for appraisal in Delgamuukw v British
Columbia20 where the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'sen litigants submitted the evidence of the location
of their houses as establishing a spiritual link with the land. The Supreme Court held that the
most “significant evidence of the spiritual connection between houses and their territory was the
feast hall” where the “people tell and retell their stories and identify their territories to remind
themselves of the sacred connection that they have with their lands.”21 The indigenous title claim
can be differentiated by ordinary usage rights, because communal land ownership is protected by
s 35(1) of the Constitution Act 82. It was deemed to connect them to indigenous culture, and
therefore was “sui generis.” The meaning of this term is broadly defined to include not only the
physical possession of the land, but also the "languages, laws, and customs that the tribe
follows". 22
Chief Justice Lamer wrote that oral histories were “tangential to the ultimate purpose of
the fact-finding process at trial in the determination of the historical truth.” 23 He allowed the
appeal, in part, because the trial judge had not afforded the oral history evidence called at the
trial appropriate weight which did not conform to evidentiary principles established in R v Van
der Peet. The implication of the trial judge's reasoning is that oral histories should never be given
any independent weight and are only useful as confirmatory evidence in aboriginal rights
18

Id. at 30.
Id. at 68.
20
3 S.C.R. 1010 (1997).
21
Id. at Para 13.
22
Id. at Para 83.
23
Id. at Para 87.
19
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litigation. His honor stated, “I fear that if this reasoning were followed, the oral histories of
aboriginal peoples would be consistently and systematically undervalued by the Canadian legal
system....” 24(emphasis added,)
The oral evidence was an important determinant in that case because the assertion of
indigenous title had an important non-economic component. The land had an intrinsic value
which was enjoyed by the community and they could not utilise it in a manner that would
“destroy its aesthetic value”.25 In order to assert a claim for title, the First Nation had the “burden
of proof that must satisfy (i) the land must have been occupied prior to European sovereignty (in
British Columbia, 1846); (ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation presovereignty, then there must be a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation;
and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive”. 26
Chief Justice Lamer wrote further that
“If the group has maintained a substantial connection with the land since sovereignty, this
establishes the required central significance.”27 This implies that the oral history need not
provide definitive and precise evidence of pre-sovereignty aboriginal occupation on the
territory claimed, but it may demonstrate that current occupation has its origins prior to
sovereignty. It also means that the interpretation of the evidence must give due weight to
the tribal people’s perspective regarding practices, customs, traditions and their
relationship with the land. In order to relax the proof of continuity requirement between
existing and pre-sovereignty occupation the claim does not need “an unbroken chain of
continuity”.28
The Court refused to draw a rigid link in terms of spatial and time connection in proving
title from oral testimony by acknowledging that
occupation and use of lands may have been disrupted for a time, perhaps as a result of the
unwillingness of European colonizers to recognize aboriginal title. To impose the
requirement of continuity too strictly would risk undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1)
by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of
colonizers who failed to respect aboriginal rights to land. ).29

24

Id. at Para 98.
Id. at Para 130.
26
Id. at Para 143.
27
Id. at Para 151.
28
Id. at Para 153.
29
Id Para . at 54, (quoting R v. Cote, 3 SCR 139 (1996)).
25
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These guidelines for the maintenance of the nexus between people and the land to
establish continuity were based on the requirement of exclusive occupation. The Court reasoned
that “[t]he proof of title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the right”.30 This is an
indication that there is no requirement of an exclusive possession of the land and that it could be
demonstrated by the “intention and capacity to retain exclusive control.”31 This principle
addressed a number of substantive issues and enunciated important principles relating to the
significance of oral history, indigenous title, and the test for proving title to land, resting upon
the scope of constitutional protection to be afforded to tribal land, and limitations on the
provincial power where the First Nation Reserve was located to extinguish title.32
Matthew Sparke writes that the evidential burden of proof in Delgamuukw for the
Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en required the indigenous tribes to translate “their oral knowledge into a
series of maps against the spatial knowledge of the Canadian state and its territorial
boundaries”.33 They communicated their history that consisted of "effectively cartographing
their lands as First Nations within the abstract state-space of Cartesian cartography" by
supplementing the provincial and federal mapping of the land with maps based on tribal nation’s
oral knowledge.34 The land claims before an uninformed or “merely skeptical Western-centric
court is a challenge to Native communities” whose wide range of cosmologies and “notions of
time and space defy the norms” and representation mechanisms conflict with established
colonising existence.35 The main difficulty for communities lies in the fact that it is “no simple
matter to distinguish what really is past or present in a particular colonizing paradigm” according
to the theory on memory induction and history formation.36
David Milward observes that there are obstacles in the manner in which the oral
testimony is heard in the courts in terms of the judges understanding of the epistemology of
indigenous cultures. This is based on the following observation:
The Supreme Court of Canada has articulated several legal principles that mandate the
flexible and generous treatment of Aboriginal oral history evidence in support of
Aboriginal rights claims. Lower courts, however, continue to devalue such evidence,
often displaying explicit disregard for the legal principles, in order to defeat rights claims
and subordinate Aboriginal interests to state sovereignty. This has no rational basis, since
30

Id. at 155.
Id. at 156, (quoting KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 204 (Oxford Clarenden Press, 1989).
32
Cheryl Suzack, The Transposition of Law and Literature in Delgamuukw and Monkey Beach, 110 S. ATLANTIC
QUARTERLY 447, 454 (2011).
33
Matthew Sparke, Map That Roared and an Original Atlas: Canada, Cartography, and the Narration of Nation, 88
Annals of the Ass’n of Am. Geographers, 463-95 (1998).
34
See also Napoleon, supra note 12.
35
Id.
36
Id.
31
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it is now clearly established that documentary historical evidence does not have any
innate superiority over oral history evidence when it comes to ascertaining what
happened in the past.37
Milward proposes that there should be training of judges in order for them to appreciate
“the potential value and accuracy of oral history evidence", and they should be able to magnify
the use of oral history evidence. This can be done by means of the more elastic use of the
doctrines of “inference and judicial notice, and using court-appointed experts” to assure greater
impartiality.38 There are clear limits placed in case law of the extent of the evidence that will be
admissible and the dividing line that exists before it may achieve probative value. This can be
achieved because “the law of evidence and substantive law are in constant dialogue with each
other”. In this context the rules of evidence “must be developed dynamically and flexibly in
order to realise fair and substantive justice for Aboriginal rights claims”.39
The court’s primary concern with indigenous oral history is its reliability; many features
of tribal oral history undermine its reliability and its probative value in courts. For example, story
tellers are replaced over time and so the keepers of the stories and courts cannot depend on the
compiler’s affirmation of the truth of the facts stated in the story.40 This fact must be balanced by
the threats to indigenous peoples’ access to their ancestral lands, which are of immense cultural
significance.41
The Courts have developed basic principles of when oral evidence will be accepted that
asserts the truth of the facts stated therein as a general rule. This is within the framework of the
best evidence rule – a cornerstone of the Canadian legal system. In Mitchell v Minister of
National Revenue42 a member of the Mohawk First Nation attempted to bring tangible goods
back across the border from the United States but refused to pay tariffs, claiming that he had an
indigenous right to trade that exempted him from having to pay customs duty on the
merchandise. The parcels brought across the border were intended as a gift to another First
Nation as a goodwill act. The Crown argued that there was no tribal right that excluded Mitchell
from having to pay duties at the border, and that even such a right were consistent with national
sovereignty, that it was necessarily invalid. In ruling, the Supreme Court operated as if
37

David Milward, In Doubting What The Elders Have To Say: A Critical Examination Of Canadian Judicial
Treatment Of Aboriginal Oral History Evidence, 14 INT’L JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF, 287 (2010).
38
See also Mathias v Canada, 207 F.T.R. 1 (2000) (holding that “stories may be reworked by different story
tellers”).
39
Milward, supra, note 35 at 301-02
40
Id. at 296; See also Jane McMillan, Colonial Traditions, Co-optations, and Mi'kmaq Legal Consciousness, 36 L.
AND SOC’Y INQUIRY 171, 194 (2011).
41
See also Larry Nesper, Indian Traditional Cultural Property in the Organized Resistance to the Canadian Mine in
Wisconsin, 36 L. AND SOC’Y INQUIRY 162 (2011) ("Not unlike the Black Hills for the Lakota…the local geography
has been growing more sacred over the decades as it is threatened by external forces").
42
1 S.C.R. 911 (2001).
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traditional Canadian sovereignty and tribal rights were not in accord. Instead, it should have
determined how the evidence would be dealt with when determining if an indigenous right
exists.
Chief Justice McLachlin ruled that the relevant law on the admission of oral history was
premised upon “where it was both useful and reasonably reliable, subject always to the
discretionary nature of the trial judge”.43 The admission of evidence was based on three factors,
namely, whether it was useful, reliable, and probative. 44
This implies that for the court to process the admissibility of indigenous oral history as
evidence it had to satisfy the hearsay rule and the best evidence rule. The inference is that oral
histories may be admitted for two reasons: firstly, they may offer evidence of ancestral practices
that would not otherwise be available, and secondly, they may provide the tribal perspective on
the right claimed. The best evidence rule means that the court will prefer written evidence over
all other evidence in most circumstances. 45
A. Procedural rules for Indigenous Litigants
The Federal Court of Canada has, in recent years, attempted to formulate evidentiary
rules for oral history evidence in an effort to be more respectful of indigenous processes. The
Federal Court Aboriginal Law Bar Liaison Committee has issued Aboriginal Litigation Practice
Guidelines which state in their preamble that in “litigation practice issues involving oral
testimony and the role of Elders, the committee continues its work with a focus on litigation
practice issues involving applications for judicial review.”46
Part IV of this article, which deals with Oral Testimony and History, sets out the Guiding
Principles of the Federal Rules which state in relevant part:
“Principle 1: The Federal Courts Rules must be applied flexibly to take into account the
Aboriginal perspective; Principle 2: Rules of procedure should be adapted so that the
Aboriginal perspective, along with the academic historical perspective, is given its due
weight; Principle 3: Elders who testify should be treated with respect; Principle 4: Elder
testimony and oral history should be approached with dignity, respect, creativity and

43

Id. at 27.
Id. at 30.
45
The rule can significantly reduce the evidentiary weight given to oral history when there is a written alternative,
and the latter may contradict oral history but not vice versa.
46
Aboriginal Litigation Practice Guidelines, Federal Court, ABORIGINAL LAW BAR LIAISON COMMITTEE, (Oct. 16,
2012), http://cas-cdc-www02.cas-satj.gc.ca/fct-cf/pdf/PracticeGuidelines%20Phase%20I%20and%20II%2016-102012%20ENG%20final.pdf.
44
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sensitivity in a fair process responsive to the norms and practices of the Aboriginal group
and the needs of the individual Elder testifying.”47
The courts are rigorous in applying the reliability of the hearsay testimony and will make
a more detailed inquiry into the facts surrounding the claim. The reputation of the narrator is the
crucial point, and the judge will assess whether the statement may have been made by the
deceased person who had “an interest in the matter” which may cast doubts on its veracity.48 The
courts will consider reliability before the witness takes the stand which allows filtering at the
earliest possible opportunity. This preliminary investigation allows the “witnesses to contradict
or confirm the accuracy of the recitation” in order to ascertain if the evidence is reliable.49
The other alternative for permitting hearsay evidence is to utilise the general hearsay
exception for statements uttered by deceased individuals if the statement concerns reputation.
As "Oral History is communal these declarations come "within the categories of public or
general rights that can be proven by declarations of reputation".50 It includes the rights to land
which are “communal in nature” and come within the “public or general rights” that can be
proven by “declarations of reputation”.51 The courts accept oral history about the position of
boundaries on tribal land under this reputation exception, for example, but excludes evidence
about the way “tribes use the land”.52
Judges also adopt judicial notice in addition to best evidence rule and the hearsay rule to
admit oral history. Functionally, judicial notice allows the courts elasticity in approaching
aboriginal oral history by allowing a judge “to make a finding of fact without evidentiary proof
provided by the parties”.53 The courts can, by referring to this principle, “take notice of the facts
that are common knowledge in the particular area in which the court is located”.54 They can
determine by the application of judicial notice the “local geography and historical facts”.55
However, there is a flaw in this process of adjudging tribal land law claims – knowledge about
customary ties with the land may not be within the general knowledge in the area where the court
is convened and “historical and geographical facts are often vigorously disputed in indigenous
land claim cases”.56

47

Id. at 10-11.
Id.
49
Mitchell supra note 40.
50
Kent McNeil and Lori Ann Roness. Legalizing Oral History: Proving Aboriginal Claims in Canadian Courts, 39
J. OF THE WEST 66, 69 (2000).
51
Id. at 68-69.
52
Id.
53
Milward, supra note 35 at 289.
54
Id. at 317.
55
Id. at 289, 318-19.
56
Id. at 316.
48
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To remedy the apparent lack of knowledge, judges have discretion under the Practice
Guidelines of Aboriginal Litigation to transfer the venue of the trial to a location on a First
Nation Reserve to facilitate the narration of evidence by elders.57 The Canadian courts have a
wide discretion in how they apply judicial notice and they can “contextualise the application of
judicial notice” to fill the lacuna in written records.58 The courts observe the evidential rules that
substantiate the evidence by the presence of corroboration, repetition and consistency. This can
be satisfied by the presence of “other oral history testimony” or the supporting evidence that is
rendered in the form of story-telling.59 The court has to evaluate the originality of the oral
testimony even when the story is admissible in order to decide what weight to assign to the
statement of the indigenous claimant who has the burden of proof in the litigation concerning
land.60 The common law courts have lowered the burden of proof in cases involving a treaty and
land claims in an effort to respect claims within their modern judicial systems. This is premised
on section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, case law, and the Practice Guidance in Aboriginal
Litigation. The courts have formulated the doctrine that allows the adducing of evidence that will
be deemed admissible if it satisfies the principle of reliability and usefulness.61
B. Conflict With Common Law Rules of Admissibility
In dealing with the Western notions of evidential value and those of indigenous cultures,
one needs to decipher the contrasts in the rules of application where the fact evidence is
concerned. Their nexus with the land provides the tribes with affiliations that are central to their
existence as communal entities, investing in them their cultural identity and security, and the
centrality of land sustains their existence and determines their relationship to the environment.62
The spiritual relationship governs the accepted practices on lands and translates it into a
From the Aboriginal Litigation Practice Guidelines: “trial management that in the course of selecting a (b) trial
venue the judge must consider having parts of the trial in the aboriginal community; assess the
advantages/disadvantages arising from the choice of venue, including: the effect that the venue may have on the
ability/ease of witnesses to testify in open court, and in particular where Elders are being called to testify.”, supra
note 44, at 8.
58
Milward, supra note 35, at 318.
59
Glen Stohr, The Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. J., 679, 692 (1999).
60
Id.
61
In R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2 S.C.R 220 (2005), Chief Justice McLaughlin wrote that “the need for a sensitive
and generous approach to the evidence tendered to establish aboriginal rights, be they be right to title or lesser rights
to fish, hunt or gather. Aboriginal people did not write down events in their pre-sovereignty histories. Therefore,
orally transmitted history must be accepted, provided the conditions of usefulness and reasonable reliability set out
in Mitchell v MNR, are respected.”
62
The importance to indigenous peoples is driven by an intention "to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems." See e.g. Eric Dannenmaier,
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compelling duty to protect their land.63 The customs, traditions and the folklore are all part of the
affinity and “belonging” with the land. 64
In deriving a link with land for indigenous peoples, the ownership of deeds is the main
obstacle to its restoration of ownership. Robert A Hershey, Jennifer McCormack, Jennifer
Newell, and EE Gillian – lawyer, law professor, geographer and archaeologist, respectively –
have proposed an interdisciplinary perspective by focusing on mapping and the potential
challenges of using navigational aids to support indigenous land-rights claims. They elucidate
the “shortcomings of colonial legal systems in justly addressing indigenous claims to revealing
the limitations of the law itself as a mechanism of justice.” 65
They provide an example by showing that there are no separate words for space and time
in the Maori language, whereas, for the Tohono O’odham, “the past exists alongside the present,
and people interact with spaces acknowledging the “wi’ikam (“those things that are left
behind”), the living objects left by the Huhugkam (“those that are gone”) and Wu:skam (“those
that emerged”): This illustrates the point that the linear notions of space and time that regulate
conduct in the dominant cultures "are not neutral and objective but , like the oral histories
thatcourts distinguish them from, have a particular perspective and history in mind.66
Obstructions to the admission of oral history via usually an exception to the hearsay rule
leads to judges potentially rejecting or undervaluing the evidence if it is not accompanied by
other corroborating evidence. This presents a disadvantage for indigenous peoples, who, given
their historical reliance on oral history, tend to lack such corroborating proof. The land claims
before an uninformed or “merely skeptical Western-centric court is a challenge to Native
communities” whose wide range of cosmologies and “notions of time and space defy the norms”
and representation mechanisms conflict with established colonising existence.67 The main
difficulty for communities lies in the fact that it is “no simple matter to distinguish what really is
past or present in a particular colonizing paradigm” according to the theory on memory induction
“Tlingit property and jurisprudence…are inextricably intertwined with the metaphysical.” Caskey Russell,
Cultures in Collision: Cosmology, Jurisprudence, and Religion in Tlingit Territory, 33 Am. Indian Q. 230, 240
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SOVEREIGNTY (Univ. of Tex. Press) (1984) ("With respect to the lands they lived on, many Indians felt a strong
religious duty to protect their territory”).
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and history formation. The consensus exists that the different angles presented by western
scholars and tribal oral histories are complimentary.68 The conveyance of land through oral
transactions by indigenous peoples would have left records thereof that could be utilised to
support oral testimony and substantiate the facts argued in the narrated accounts.
The landmark decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,69 by the Supreme Court
indicates that archaeological evidence may substantiate indigenous land claims in the future.
This ruling was the first time in Canadian history that a court has declared native title to lands
outside of a reserve and the ruling also rejected the “postage stamp” view of tribe’s land
permanently. The title is not restricted to small, intensively used sites and extends to all the
territory that a First Nation, regularly and exclusively, used when the Crown asserted
sovereignty. This means ownership is of areas that were utilized only by the Tsilhqot’in at the
time the Canadian government staked its claim. 70
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia overrides the Western discourse which prioritizes
the written word as the dominant form of record keeping and, until recently, the tendency of
academics to consider oral societies to be peoples without history. Hulan and Eigenbrod argue in
Oral Histories and Oral Traditions that oral traditions are “the means by which knowledge is
reproduced, preserved and conveyed from generation to generation and oral traditions form the
foundation of Aboriginal societies, connecting speaker and listener in communal experience and
uniting past and present in memory.”71 They argue against the presumption that that written
evidence is the best evidence available based on the following facts:
The discussions of oral history have occasionally been framed in over simplistic
oppositional binaries: oral/writing, uncivilized/civilized, subjective/objective. Critics
wary of oral history tend to frame oral history as subjective and biased, in comparison to
As Stó:lō historian Naxaxahtls’i (Albert “Sonny” McHalsie) observes: “The academic world and the oral history
process both share an important common principle: they contribute to knowledge by building upon what is known
and remembering that learning is a life-long quest. Together oral and written methods of recalling and recounting
the past have the potential to contribute greatly to the historical record.” Albert “Sonny” McHalsie (Naxaxalht’i),
We Have to Take Care of Everything That Belongs to Us, in Be of Good Mind: Essays on the Coast Salish, 82
(Bruce Granville Miller, ed., Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
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writing’s presumed rationality and objectivity. In Western contexts, authors of written
documents tend to be received automatically as authorities on their subjects and what is
written down is taken as fact. Such assumptions ignore the fact that authors of written
documents bring their own experiences, agendas and biases to their work—that is, they
are subjective.72
The anthropologists argue that the divide between oral and written history is a
misconception and writing and orality do not exclude each other; rather they are complementary.
This is corroborated by the Stó:lō historian Naxaxahtls’i Albert “Sonny” McHalsie who writes:
“The academic world and the oral history process both share an important common principle:
they contribute to knowledge by building upon what is known and remembering that learning is
a life-long quest.”73 Together, the oral and written methods of evoking and remembering the
past have the potential to contribute immensely to the historical record.
The veracity of oral history according to this reasoning is a legitimate and valuable
addition to the historical record. The oral-based knowledge systems are predominant among
indigenous peoples as an extra-curricular “discourse and form part of ceremonies to validate a
person’s or family’s authority, responsibilities, or prestige”.74 There are some stories that are
narrated at particular times or places or by people that often inform important wisdom about a
given tribe's culture, the land, and the manner of interaction with each other and their
environment. The conveying of these stories inter generationally maintains the social order intact
and the oral histories must be conveyed diligently and accurately and it is often the repository of
wisdom in the designated person of the tribe. This person is responsible for keeping the
knowledge and eventually transferring it in order to preserve the historical record.
John Borrows writes that the format of storytelling places the “importance on accuracy,
oral narratives often present variations, either subtly, or otherwise whenever they are told”. The
narrators may locate an incident “in context, to emphasize particular aspects of the story or to
present a lesson in a new manner among other reasons”. Then by force of repetition, a story
becomes elaborate and creates a broader and more comprehensive narrative. If the listeners ever
invoke the narrative elsewhere, “they would be expected to a certain extent to reflect their
interpretation of events and to better apply the story to its existing context. In some instances,
precision and the contextualizing have their objectivity ascertained by the storytellers.”75
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This may be differentiated with written history that represents a discourse but a static
record of an authority’s singular recounting of a series of events. The readers of the manuscript
may interpret these writings, but the documentary record remains in perpetuity. The same oral
narratives, on the other hand, do not have to be identical - what is fundamental is whether or not
they carry the same message.
III.

U.S. COURTS

In comparison with Canada, the courts in the U.S. have been less accommodating “to
accept indigenous oral history as proof of Indian land claims based on the hearsay rules of
evidence, because the original story teller cannot be summoned and there is no written record to
confirm the recounted events.”76 This is despite the fact this is the “'best' evidence of such
claims” or could be the only available proof in the matter. 77
The U.S. has inherited the common law from its English origins, and success in litigation
can be measured as such against the principles adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
United States Constitution, and the relevant case law. This portion of the article is examines oral
storytelling as testimony in claims to prove title on land and its reception in the U.S. courts. As it
applies to the United States, courts should attempt to adopt a receptive theory of oral evidence, as
doing so will facilitate pre-trial hearings, directional stages, and required disclosures with
informed knowledge of the historical and anthropological evidential value of oral stories.
Episteme can be applied to define the admissibility of hearsay oral evidence and to corroborate
that with anthropological evidence.
A. Federal Evidence Rules and Exception To Hearsay
In dealing with Native American claimants, there are two branches of courts in the U.S.
that consider oral hearsay evidence, the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), and the Federal Circuit
Courts. The manner in which evidence is presented is an important factor in terms of
admissibility; the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) apply the best evidence rule and prioritize the
submission of original evidence which is written unless otherwise stated. 78
The case law of the CFC lends few clues or leads as to how oral evidence may be
admitted regardless of its hearsay status. The acceptance for an expert’s opinion testimony is one
such example, as it is based upon personal knowledge, facts already in the record, and facts not
76
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in the record. Those facts not in the record must be “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions and inferences upon the subject.”79 This provides some
flexibility because the expert can base an opinion on facts not in the record and could rely on that
opinion on “facts [that] may be inadmissible hearsay.” 80 There has also been speculation that the
litigants tendering evidence based on stories that establish a connection with land may be acting
from personal gain and that makes their evidence unreliable.81
The Courts have had to weigh the admissibility of oral evidence and its probative value
against the documentary evidence offered by the other party. In Pueblo de Zia v. United States,82
the claimants offered evidence from various tribal council members, which consisted of “oral
accounts handed down from father to son . . . from time immemorial”.83 The Court stated that
because the opposing party did not proffer any evidence of its own, the court would give the oral
tradition “some weight.”84 However, the court qualified the use of the oral traditional evidence
by stating that “corroboration of "historical and archaeological evidence and testimony” may be
necessary. 85
In Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v. United States86 the
FCC affirmed that Indian title does not apply to those areas where the tribes had "permanent
villages" but included those areas where it had "intermittent control" and that over period that it
"used and occupied to acquire title" could not be fixed "precisely but had to be long enough to
become domestic territory." 87 The ruling strongly emphasized the importance of cross-checking
oral evidence “since informants can mislead researchers by describing some period . . . besides
the aboriginal, pre- treaty period”. 88
While these two cases established that tribal claimants could adduce oral traditional
evidence in courts, the requirement for corroboration by outside sources has severely limited its
application. The most significant case decided in the CFC in which oral narratives came up for
their conformity with the established rules of evidence was Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States.89
Plaintiffs, members of the Zuni tribe of New Mexico, brought a claim based upon oral narratives
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that had been conveyed to them by their parents and grandparents. They sought compensation for
the alleged taking of lands and the court had to decide whether the Zuni had aboriginal title to the
land in question.90 The claimants had to prove “actual, exclusive, and continuous use and
occupancy for a long time (or from time immemorial).”91
The Zuni’s expert witness utilized specialized techniques to present the evidence to the
court in the form of anecdotal testimony. The court considered the matter and without any
specific discourse about the manner in which it was compiled admitted the testimony and the
claimants succeeded. 92 However, the court acknowledged that much of the evidence offered
consisted of oral histories and held as follows:
Defendant conjectures but offers no evidence to contradict or impeach the Zuni
recounting of their history. And, given the import attached to the oral transmission of
history and religious observation by the Zuni, there is no reason to suspect gross or
deliberate distortion. Accordingly, the court is persuaded that, notwithstanding some
insufficiency, this recounted history is of evidentiary probity.93
The ruling did not provide any binding authority for other courts to follow, nor explained
as to why exactly it was persuaded that the histories were “of evidentiary probity.”94 The expert
witness, Andrew Wiget, was an anthropologist who assisted the Zuni in this case and provided
information as to the tribe's oral histories, consisting of 1,300 pages of deposition testimony.
This evidence was anecdotal rather than formalized oral tradition, but Widget presented it in a
framework that met the court’s requirements.95 The large amount of oral traditional evidence was
admissible specifically because of the expert witness’s innovative presentation.
To return to the subject of expert testimony: courts may allow external basis for admitting
opinion evidence if “the expert is fully capable of judging for himself what is, or is not, a
reliable basis for his opinion.” 96 Whiteley argues that the expert opinion testimony about a
tribe’s oral traditions and history would come under this category and while the evidence about
oral histories cannot be expected to “conform exactly to scientific models of falsifiability.” Oral
traditions may be interpreted to prove the facts of the case, but they primarily exist as cultural
90
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“canons for evaluating truth-claims and appraising the plausibility of particular accounts of the
past.” 97
Whiteley gives an example related to stories about the migration of a particular Hopi clan
to their contemporary location. These accounts “are entrenched features of a corpus of Hopi
narratives,” thus an individual who tells the stories incorrectly “would be dismissed as a knownothing….” 98 This is a process which he describes as subjecting the account to “critical
standards of historical judgment,” and as the expert’s own evaluation of a reliable basis.99 The
judgment therefore reflects the view that a court’s focus should be on the reliability of the
opinion and its foundation rather than the fact that it is technically hearsay.100
The
other
option for admitting testimony from Native litigants in the form of oral traditions is to use one of
multiple existing hearsay exception under the FREs. Rule 803(20) allows the admission of
hearsay testimony to prove “reputation concerning boundaries or general history.101 The text of
this hearsay exception allows testimony that implicates the “[r]eputation in a community, arising
before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community, and
reputation as to events of general history important to the community”.102
In Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp103 the Sokaogon tribe sought a declaration
that the tribe had the right to occupy a particular tract of land rich in mineral deposits. They
primarily used oral traditional evidence detailing a promise of a reservation. The issue before the
court was whether the Sokaogon had ceded their right after negotiating a treaty during the 1800s.
It ruled that “there is no documentation of this tradition, which is at best embroidered (too many
ransoms, shipwrecks, lost and stolen maps, and deathbed revelations to be plausible) and at worst
fictitious.” 104 The Circuit Court held that the Sokaogon had failed to state a claim in the
framework that could circumvent the documentary evidence. It explained that oral traditional
evidence was not admissible because “no effort was made by the Sokaogon’s counsel to cast it
into a form in which it would be admissible in a court of law.”105 This appeared to be taking a
more stringent approach compared to the rationale developed in the preceding cases decided
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before the change of approach that came in the 1960s when hearsay evidence tendered by the
Native tribes began to receive some credibility in the courts.106
Litigation over land claims are still governed by the FCC decision in Zuni Tribe where
the Court accepted that the ancient ties of the Zuni to the land were manifest in the tribal oral
tradition about Zuni origin and migration and in the physical artefacts representing the
archaeological history of Zuni culture.107 There was evidence that had probative value in the oral
tradition because it attached the community to accurate transmission of oral history, "and the
presentation of oral history in a deposition form made it "more persuasive to the court." 108 The
validity of the evidence was established "through corroboration between different pieces of the
oral history testimony"109 reliability or repeatability, tested through the ability of witnesses to
render the story on various occasions; and 'consistency' meaning the conformity of testimony
with other testimony".110
However, after the Sokaogon ruling, tribes in the future will be forced to speculate as to
whether circuit courts will reject oral testimony when there is more recent documentary evidence
available that conflicts with the type of evidence in Zuni. If courts were to set out guidelines, any
future tribal claimants would be able to ascertain when to submit their evidence, and whether that
evidence would be found admissible, thereby reducing the number appeals in the federal
courts.111 The only statutory exception that exists in legislation in terms of specifically admitting
Native oral history hearsay evidence is the Native Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA), which permits the testimony of oral evidence in support of claims for ancestral
remains. The statute has achieved what the courts have been unwilling to set out in rulings in

106

See Pueblo de Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 505 (1964) (declaring that oral traditional evidence entitled
to “some weight”).
107
Dwight G. Newman, Tsilqot 'in Nation v British Columbia and Civil Justice: Analysing the Procedural
Interaction of Evidentiary Principles and Aboriginal Oral History, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 433, 448 (2005).
108
Id.
109
Stohr, supra note 56, at 692 .
110
Id.
111
The Advisory Committee on Hearsay Evidence that stated that the hearsay exception “is based upon the general
admissibility of evidence of reputation as to land boundaries and land customs, expanded in this country to include
private as well as public boundaries.” However, the rule is not sufficiently developed, and the courts have had to
view the Indigenous claims in the Circuit courts on the facts of each case. This leaves the rule open to interpretation
of the judges, and as such standard rules of application have not been formulated. See also McCormick on Evidence
§ 299. (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (explaining that “the Circuits appear divided as to whether in typical
grand jury situations exculpatory testimony meets this [‘similar motive’] requirement of the Rule”); Michael M.
Martin, The Former-Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 IOWA L. REV. 547, 557
(1972) (the common law formulation of the exception was easier to apply than the Federal Rule, in part because the
Rules’ drafters provided no criteria to guide judges in its application).

161

placing oral evidence parallel to documentary evidence. 112 There needs to be cultural
significance to land as there is to the ancestral remains of the Native tribes. 113
In Canada, the approach is based upon the written rules and codes that have been
formulated for the determination of storytelling as evidence. The evidence that is collated from
archaeological proofing can be supportive of such oral testimony. The Canadian courts have
rejected the concept of terra nullius, removing an impediment on indigenous claims establishing
title or interest in land. The Supreme Court has given the new constitutional framework an
interpretation that provides equal treatment of oral history and documentary evidence.114 Oral
history evidence has to be treated in accordance with the spirit of the constitution, and “it has to
be given real and fair chance to prove an aboriginal rights claim…if the oral history evidence is
subjected to a critical inquiry as to its ultimate reliability, then the documentary and historical
evidence should be subjected to that enquiry as well.”115
This provides an incentive to the submission of evidence in the form of oral testimony
that has the potential to be admitted as the truth of the facts stated therein. It can be supportive
and can corroborate the evidence that is presented by the anthropological findings. Roger Anyon,
et al state that the oral narratives and archaeological evidence are complimentary and can be
reach similar findings because of the geographical facts surrounding the land:
It is important to recognize that oral traditions and archaeology represent two separate,
but overlapping, ways of knowing the past. Because they are qualitatively distinct,
different standards apply in the way that information is collected, evaluated, and used to
understand the past. These sources of knowledge converge in a broad sense on certain
issues and themes, however, such as migrations, warfare, residential mobility, land use,
and ethnic co residence. Both sources can therefore be used productively to investigate
these issues, among others.116
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Consensus exists among certain circles that the perspectives of western scholars and
indigenous oral histories are complimentary.117 This leads to a more receptive theory of evidence
and allows the admission of evidence as truth of the facts stated when the common law courts
evaluate its admissibility and probative value. Evidence can, and should be, admitted done when
it is deemed as part of the cultural framework of the indigenous peoples, and it is admitted in the
context of a society of tribal peoples who use oral communication in their intergenerational
storytelling and allegiance to their ancestral lands.
B. Episteme In Indigenous Cultural Framework
The accumulation of oral tradition in indigenous societies is based on a “collective
enterprise” because a narrator does not generally hold singular authority over a story, and the
nuances evident in distinct versions of a specific history are “peer reviewed” if the events and the
various ways people have internalised them. The validity of oral histories flows from the group,
and it stems from the principle that no one person can claim ownership to an entire history of the
people. The narrators will “document” the histories and will recite from the source of their
knowledge, such as a great grandparent or an elder in their family. This is sometimes referred to
as “oral footnoting”.118
The collective responsibility that derives from this historical record and its accuracy
creates a space for interacting with the environment and the landscape that provides the spatial
and temporal link as the resource for original stories by the elders.119 Admissibility naturally
includes the concept of epistemology, which underlies the grounds upon which oral testimony
should be admissible in court as the accepted mode of expression and memory of the indigenous
claimants for land-based rights. Legal philosopher Michel Foucault's coined the concept of the
“episteme” as an archaeological source to understand the way cultures organised themselves and
its reflection in their behaviour. The knowledge-based phenomenon provides an insight into the
expressions of the institutional structure of a people that “predominated in a historical time
McHalsie, supra note 65 at 82, “[t]he academic world and the oral history process both share an important
common principle: they contribute to knowledge by building upon what is known and remembering that learning is
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period” when their own set of beliefs and customs distinguished and created their
epistemology.120 There is an assumption that the empirical scientific principles cannot define an
objective truth or be rationally defended as against other epistemic principles.121 This implies
that the episteme is believed by any group of people as their recorded fact and a set of beliefs in
which their structures are founded as truthful.122 It also rejects the notion that there is one set of
beliefs that are overriding as truth in determining what is regarded as accepted fact in that
particular period or epoch.
The philosophical argument creates a methodology to evaluate the relationship between
language and the law by a recourse to episteme that can be understood in the context of the
bonds of the kinship in an indigenous group. Oral histories can be adequately appreciated
if the orally-transmitted representations of the historical past rely on memories which conform
to reliability and accuracy of the landscape. The implication is that the objective truth which
challenges western beliefs depends on the episteme of the tribal people and this is grounded in
their own environment and story-telling.123 The admissibility of evidence should be adjudged by
its epistemological basis in any pre-trial hearing to determine that it should be allowed in as
evidence.
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Episteme is critically evaluated by anthropologists to overcome “colonial ideologies that
remain embedded in social discourse, with communicative processes legitimizing contemporary
power structures in the ways they represent individuals, institutions and their interests”.124 It has
been argued that the concept of episteme invites the consideration of “the politics of identity and
the ethics inherent in encounters of difference … to … emphasize inequality, disjuncture and the
impossibility of understanding and accommodation”.125
The post-colonial framework requires understanding of epistemology of the indigenous
peoples, and anthropologists Frenkal and Shenhaw argue that such an understanding will
override the presumption that colonial societies have no philosophical underpinning. A nonbinary epistemology suggests "collapsing the boundary between West and non-West and
allowing for hybridity to filter in, without denying the asymmetrical power relations between
them".126 The adoption of a non-binary perspective will lead to improved insight as " to show
how western and nonwestern experiences (and representations) are inseparable; and how binary
perspectives may purify the colonial practice and mask its hybrid history".127
The purpose of obtaining cultural knowledge in this context of post colonialism is to
achieve justice when dealing with tribal land claims; appreciation of episteme would lead to an
insight for judicial evaluation of evidence when submissions are heard in court.128 The retention
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of inter-generational stories deserve recognition because of their preservation, and they should
be adopted as part of the reception theory of evidence. Those stories are an important part of how
law functions in an environment and the impact of the customs on the language and culture of a
group that would be facilitated by the admissibility of oral testimony submitted as truth of the
facts stated.129 The knowledge that is stored in epistemology of indigenous customs should
enable litigation to proceed and for oral narratives to be tendered in evidence if the reception
theory is adopted.
The contemporary debate has moved to accepting storytelling and questioning whether
oral materials have veracity to modern anthropological approaches which concentrate on the
issue of reliability. This discourse is concerned with examining the ways in which contemporary
people utilise these narratives to evaluate the current circumstances of the tribes and their
memory and perception of their histories. There is an evolving study in which the case law,
treaty interpretation, and evidential guidelines have all contributed to this development.
At present an issue that prevents the admissibility of oral evidence from Native witnesses
is the evidence that is agreed upon by both parties in the case. This process of co-production "has
become increasingly popular in the last decade" but its problem is how " to admit co-produced
information as evidence. While the methods of admitting novel scientific evidence and oral
history evidence are well understood, co-produced evidence does not fit neatly into either
category".130
Miller argues that this is “certainly the view of mainstream practising lawyers and
judges,” and he proposes that there is need “to clarify how oral materials might enter into the
practice of common law other than simply noting that to fail to do so would place Aboriginal
people at a disadvantage and that fair dealing requires”.131 The assimilation of “Aboriginal law
into the a larger, national body of law” does not “clarify the particular problems of evidence law
and the creative arguments that might be made regarding” its compatibility in the Canadian
courts.132
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The difficulty to which Miller refers is that “in integrating oral traditions into the court is
simply defining the term and its cognates. Too many of the definitions, or manipulations of
definitions, appear to have been created by those without direct experience with them, or are too
focused on a limited inventory of examples and types”. This form of reasoning avoids
recognising the epistemology of the sources and wisdom, and is an imposition of an inflexible
approach based on rigid application of formulistic concept of language that ignores the historical
tradition that are non-textual and tendered as evidence in the “form of critical, lively intelligence
which surrounds status, activities, gestures, and speech”.133 The framework that will override
such an approach is a receptive theory based upon a concept that prescribes meanings from the
perspectives of anthropologists to analyse the processes over time in order to rationalise and
understand cultural idioms in the present age.134 This is a semiotic inquiry that relies on , signs,
speech and gestures and historical meanings and inferences can be drawn by the listener based
on a "broad theoretical and evidential foundation with language defined as communication based
on symbols rather than grammar with the "progression of signs (icon, index and symbol)" as a
convention.135 The admissibility of indigenous witness testimony will be reliant
on
understanding the interactions through movement and expression, and not by genre, tone,
structure, and the social conditions which are typical of interpreting the literary texts.136
The reception theory can be applied by analogy to landscape architecture by its accuracy
and detail stored in the memory of the narrator. The main difference with literary works is that
oral narratives are accessible only to the imagination and the physical landscapes are accessible
to the senses as well as to the imagination. This differs from the typical analysis of landscapes
and does not uphold accepted terms of definition such as “formal” and “picturesque,” unless
those terms had significance for landscape viewers and can be contextualised. The landscape
historian John Dixon Hunt in exploring the “virtual reality of gardens” states that the literary
reception theory of designed landscapes can be adapted to its study and is an approach through
the “experience of gardens enlarges how we understand their significance and understanding”.
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Hunt’s argument assumes that the “survival of gardens and landscapes is largely related
to their public reception” and he raises questions about the preservation of historical sites. This
can be interpreted on the same basis as premised on memory of the narrator in story-telling to
claim land ownership because they rely upon a visual reality of establishing a connection with
land by means of oral narratives rather than a literary connection. The principles can be applied
in the reception theory of land that extends it to presentation of the conservation which accords
with the indigenous claims upon the estate.137
The indigenous peoples accounts based on oral narratives is a reflection of the virtual
reality that the testimony is premised upon and it should be judged on its accuracy and reliability.
It will draw a link with the judicial interpretation by understanding the epistemology that
provides different terms to the same facts which have a precedent in the historical circumstances
of tribes and their connection with the land that enables the claim to rest on the semiotics of
expressions and gestures.138 This could be formalised in the law by the concepts that are in
lexiconic usage of the indigenous peoples and could serve as platform for admissibility of
hearsay evidence under the best evidence rule without any procedural barriers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Throughout history, indigenous societies in North America have relied on the oral
transmission of stories, histories, lessons, and other knowledge to maintain a historical record
and sustain their cultures and identities. The Western discourse had come to prioritise the written
word as the dominant form of record keeping and until recently the abstract concept of terra
nullius designated the indigenous societies with no prior title to land. This has been proven to be
misplaced because the debate of oral historiography has been framed in oppositional binaries:
oral/writing, uncivilised/civilised, subjective/objective. The critics of oral history tend to frame
its epistemology as subjective and biased in comparison to writing’s assumed rationality and
objectivity.
The notion that authors of written documents tend to be received logically as authorities
and their subjects and deeds are presumed as fact ignores the reasoning that the authors of
written documents bring their own agendas, inclinations and prejudices to their work which may
render their testimony as false. The issues that may arise that militate against the admission of
oral narratives is the rule against hearsay in the common law courts that attaches great
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importance to reliability, or the consistency of evidence with which the plaintiff/claimant will
recollect the same source about the events on separate occasions. The issue of veracity and the
degree to which the form or content of a single testimony conforms to other testimonies are for
the courts to evaluate. It may also be necessary to determine if the evidence being tendered to
establish a connection with the ancestral property is obsolete in terms of not giving rise to a
chain of narrative originality.
There is a more responsive attitude towards the acceptance of oral evidence in court
which stems from the Constitution Act, section 35, which requires the rights of the indigenous
peoples to be “recognised and affirmed” through a process of reconciling tribal and non-tribal
interests. The principle was stated in the R v Van der Peet case that the special nature of land
claims and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there
were no written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged. The obligation is on the
courts to view the evidence presented by the claimants from their perspective. The courts must
evaluate the oral history and along with the best evidence and hearsay rules that will enable them
to decide upon its admissibility and probative value.
In the U.S., the Federal Court of Claims and the circuit courts have the power to hear oral
evidence based on narrative accounts, but they have not adopted a standard rule or specific
regulations to admit such evidence. The discretion of the judges in the cases involving
indigenous story telling as evidence has created ambiguities in this area, and while there are clear
rules which cause the exclusion of such evidence the corresponding rule as to what leads to its
inclusion are not ascertainable in the judgment of the courts.
The western-centric logic of documentary evidence as the only means of arguing a case
with substantive proof is not borne out by scientific analysis. Anthropological and archaeological
evidence points to a strong connection between land and tribes and communities who have lived
there since time immemorial. This has been established by cartographic and empirical techniques
that could form geographical and geological supporting evidence. However, storytelling is an
ancient tradition among the indigenous peoples and its admissibility based on oral narratives
encompasses all of these meanings that can help move beyond a superficial treatment of oral
histories. The knowledge of the culture of the tribal peoples is a prerequisite in basing an
understanding ingrained in their epistemology. These are intellectually informed exercises of
thought and belief and science corroborates them and a general principle can be established that
they should be treated as ‘virtual’ reality. It is the accuracy, reliability, and detail that the court
should consider in determining their admissibility in court.
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